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ABSTRACT
Axelrod’s work on the prisoner’s dilemma is one of the most discussed models of social co-
operation. While many aspects of his computer simulations have been debated, their evolu-
tionary mechanism has not yet received the same attention. We know people do not differ
only in the way they act, but also in how they change their behavior – some may like safe
routines, others risk with the new. Yet in formal models cultural evolution is taken to be
an homogeneous process, such as the imitation of successful peers. In this paper we chal-
lenge this view and we propose an agent-based model that takes into account heterogeneity
among individuals’ learning strategies. The evolutionary dynamic is an adaptation of the
so-called consumat approach, originally developed by Wander Jager and Marco Janssen in
order to integrate different models of individuals behavior.
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1. Introduction
After more than thirty years from the publication of its early results, Ax-
elrod’s prisoner’s dilemma tournament remains a cornerstone of evolution-
ary explanation of social cooperation. These explanations aim at illustrating
how cooperation among rational self-interested agents may emerge even in
absence of a central authority. Over the years, scholars have been testing
the robustness of Axelrod’s conclusions as well as extending his model to in-
corporate some key features that were neglected in the original work. Some
notable examples are the introduction of noise and of network effects.1 While
many aspects of Axelrod’s work have been discussed in details and sometimes
modified, the evolutionary dynamic has been left almost untouched. Yet it
*I would like to thank Federico Cecconi, Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa, Mara Menegon and Luca Tam-
bolo for submitting the strategies used in the agent-based model. With their contribution, this work has been
a lot more fun. Special thanks to Gustavo Cevolani and Wander Jager for discussing early versions of the
consumat formalization and to Chiara Freguglia for revising the manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies.
All errors are my own.
1 The effect of noise was taken into account as early as in 1985 by Molander [4]. On noise, see also Nowak and
Sigmund [5] and Wu and Axelrod [6]. On network effects, see for example Santos and Pacheco [8].
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seems unrealistic to assume that all the individuals would engage in the same
learning pattern, i.e. the simple imitation of successful neighbours. It seems
instead more reasonable to assume that individuals are heterogeneous even
in the way they learn from experience and from others.
The aim of this paper is to propose an agent-based model that accounts
for a such an heterogeneity, adapting the consumat approach to the prisoner’s
dilemma. The consumat approach, originally formulated by Wander Jager
[9] [10] to model individuals behavior, is a meta-model that allows agents
to choose from a pool of learning strategies, which includes imitation as a
special case. The choice depends both on the agents disposition and on the
circumstances.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we briefly introduce Axelrod’s work.
We then sketch the fundamental insights of the consumat approach (Section
3.1) and a possible adaptation to the prisoner’s dilemma (Section 3.2). Sec-
tion 4 illustrates how the consumat approach leads to different evolutionary
patterns and alternative final outcomes when compared to the classic model.
Section 5 will conclude our discussion with some general remarks.
2. The prisoner’s dilemma and computer simulations
The prisoner’s dilemma is the most studied game that aims at modelling so-
cial cooperation. Figure 1 illustrates the decision matrix of the game. To
qualify as a prisoner’s dilemma, pay-offs must satisfy the following condi-
tions (i) temptation > reward > punishment > sucker (ii) reward > (temptation+
sucker)/2. Bracketed numbers are standard pay-off values that satisfy the
mentioned conditions.2
In its simplest form, the solution of the prisoner’s dilemma is straight-
forward. If players are rational, they both defect, obtaining the second-last
preferred outcome, since mutual cooperation would lead to a better outcome
for both players. In other words, the prisoner’s dilemma models a situation
in which two rational players are unable to coordinate their choices for mu-
tual benefit. According to a long — and controversial — tradition, which
dates back at least to Hobbes’ Leviathan, it is then the interest of individu-
als to call in a third player — the State — which has the coercive power to
enforce cooperation.
The solution of the prisoner’s dilemma is not as immediate if the game is
iterated, i.e. individuals do not play the game only once, but several times.
We are now interested in knowing which is the best strategy, i.e. an algo-
2 For an introduction on the prisoner’s dilemma, see Kuhn [18].
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Figure 1: The prisoner’s dilemma pay-off matrix
rithm that specifies which move to make at each repetition of the game. For
example, one simple strategy is ALWAYS-DEFECT. Intuitively, an indi-
vidual playing this strategy will defect every round of the game.
As it is well known, Axelrod [1] [2] organized a series of virtual tourna-
ments of competing strategies playing an iterated version of the prisoner’s
dilemma. Scholars from different disciplines were invited to submit a strat-
egy. Each strategy would then play against all the others, aiming to obtain
the highest pay-off. The strategy that won the tournament was TIT-FOR-
TAT, submitted by the mathematician Anatol Rapoport. Axelrod’s conclu-
sion was that if a simple strategy such as TIT-FOR-TAT outperforms defec-
tion, cooperation may emerge even in the absence of a central authority.
An agent who plays TIT-FOR-TAT will cooperate in the first round and
then do what the opponent did in the previous round. Hence, TIT-FOR-
TAT never defects first, but is not exploitable by a defecting strategy. For
example, suppose that an agent playing TIT-FOR-TAT faces another agent
playing the same strategy. The two agents will keep cooperating. Suppose
now the same agent faces an agent which plays ALWAYS-DEFECT.He will
cooperate the first round, but defect every other (see Figure 2).
To illustrate how TIT-FOR-TAT can outperform ALWAYS-DEFECT
consider the following example. Suppose a population of agents, some of
which play ALWAYS-DEFECT and some TIT-FOR-TAT. In each round,
agents are paired randomly and play the prisoner’s dilemma. An agent play-
ing ALWAYS-DEFECT will obtain the punishment pay-off every round re-
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TIT-FOR-TAT TIT-FOR-TAT TIT-FOR-TAT ALWAYS-DEFECT
Round 1 Cooperate Cooperate Round 1 Cooperate Defect
Round 2 Cooperate Cooperate Round 2 Defect Defect
Cooperate Cooperate Defect Defect
Round n Cooperate Cooperate Round n Defect Defect
…. ….
Figure 2: Iteration of the prisoner’s dilemma
gardless of the kind of strategy played by the agent he is facing. An agent
playing TIT-FOR-TAT will obtain the punishment pay-off only when fac-
ing defectors. On the other hand, he will obtain the reward pay-off every
time he meets another agent playing TIT-FOR-TAT, as a result of mutual
cooperation. As reward > punishment, the average pay-off of agents play-
ing TIT-FOR-TAT will be greater than the average pay-off of agent playing
ALWAYS-DEFECT.
Further computer simulations, inspired by the collaboration with the
evolutionary biologist W. D. Hamilton, confirmed the success of TIT-FOR-
TAT as extremely robust. TIT-FOR-TAT resulted to be the best strategy
when playing in different pools of strategies, as well as in evolving popu-
lations. In the first tournament, the number of agents remained the same
over time and so the strategy they played. In the following tournaments,
Axelrod experimented different evolutionary mechanism, all inspired by the
principle of differential reproduction: strategies which obtain a better pay-
off would tend to become more common in the population, while strategies
which are not successful would tend to become less common and eventually
disappear.
One interesting evolutionary mechanism, which might be a good model
of cultural evolution, is the imitation of successful peers in a simple network.
In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that individuals tend to copy the be-
havior of others if it is more successful than their own. In the computer
simulation, this means that agents see only a fraction of the total popula-
tion, i.e. the agents they are linked to, or their neighbours. Among those
they see, they copy the strategy played by the agent with the highest pay-
off. Figure 3 illustrates a simple network, a regular square lattice. In this
network, each agent is linked to his four adjacent neighbours. In Figure 3
agents are represented by black dots and links by red lines.
3. The Consumat Approach
The consumat approach is a meta-model of human behaviour, originally de-
veloped by Jager [9]. The consumat approach aims at providing a unifying
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Figure 3: A regular square-lattice network
framework for partial models of individual behaviour. While a full expo-
sition of the consumat approach is beyond the purpose of this article, we
introduce its principles in the next section.
3.1. Fundamental insights
Social imitation or rational deliberation are just two possible examples of
the many cognitive processes that people may engage in. According to the
consumat approach, it is reasonable to suppose that
• cognitive processes have different costs, in terms of the amount of in-
formation they need to compute. For example, rational deliberation
appears to be the most expensive in terms of cognitive resources.
• cognitive processes can bemore self-oriented or more socially-oriented.
Rational deliberation falls in the former category, while social imita-
tion in the latter.
• the same individual tends to choose different cognitive processes in dif-
ferent circumstances. For example, one would engage in an expensive
cognitive process only if one expects a great improvement in his condi-
tion and if one has relevant information at hand. On the other hand, if
the decision does not seem important an individual would tend to en-
gage in less expensive cognitive processes, such as repeating a routine
behaviour.
• different individuals have a different tendency in engaging in one par-
ticular cognitive process, at the expenses of the others. For example,
some individuals are more prone to follow what others do, rather than
deliberate on their own.
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What makes one cognitive process more relevant in comparison to others de-
pends on two factors: the perceived satisfaction and the uncertainty level.
Satisfaction expresses the fulfilment of the different needs that individuals
might have. It is reasonable to assume that individuals engage in expen-
sive cognitive behavior only if highly unsatisfied, thus expecting that it is
worth to invest a great amount of resources to improve their condition. Un-
certainty refers to the confidence one has in his ability to understand the
environment and act in an efficient way. If an individual does not feel con-
fident, he would tend to imitate successful behavior of others, rather than
deliberate on his own.
Ideally, there is a continuum of cognitive processes, which differ for cog-
nitive effort and degree of deliberation. For simplicity, the consumat ap-
proach includes four different cognitive processes, which correspond to dif-
ferent models of individual behavior
1. Repetition of one’s last action. Repetition is cheap in cognitive effort
and individually determined. Hence, it is the choice of satisfied and
confident individuals. Repetition of routine behavior is inspired by
the Classic Conditioning Theory, made popular by the experimental
findings of Pavlov [11].
2. Rational deliberation. Rational deliberation aims at optimising one’s
utility, considering all the possible options and weighting all the avail-
able information. For this reasons, deliberation is cognitively expen-
sive and individually determined. Hence, it is the choice of unsatisfied,
but confident individuals. The classic work on rationality is Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern [12].
3. Imitation of successful peers. Imitation is cheap in cognitive effort and
socially determined. Hence, it is the choice of satisfied, but not confi-
dent individuals. Imitation refers to social learning theory, developed
by Bandura [13].
4. Inquiry. Inquiry involves deep social research. It is then cognitive
expensive and socially determined. Agents who choose to inquire will
consider the behaviour of all other individuals and imitate the most
successful one.3
We can now introduce a decision matrix that illustrates the previous discus-
sion (Figure 4).
3 The inquiring process was not present in the first formulation of the consumat approach. It has been intro-
duced by Jager and Janssen [15] in 2012 and is inspired by sophisticated forms of social learning, such as the
one introduced by Festinger [14].
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Figure 4: Consumat decision matrix
3.2. Adapting the consumat approach to the prisoner’s dilemma
The consumat approach has been introduced to model consumer behavior,
but it has been successfully applied to a number of different context. For
example, Speelman et al. [16] models farmers deciding which crop to grow
and Jager and Janssen [17] models demographic dynamics. In this section,
we propose a new application of the consumat approach to the prisoner’s
dilemma.
In this new application, the different cognitive processes modelled by the
consumat approach translate in alternative ways to choose a strategy for the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma. For example, suppose that at time t agents i’s
strategy is ALWAYS-COOPERATE and agent j’s strategy is ALWAYS-
DEFECT. If at time t+1 agent i imitates agent j, then i’s new strategy be-
comes ALWAYS-DEFECT. Until his strategy changes again, agent i will
act according to his new strategy and defect in every interaction.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, the four cognitive processes translate as fol-
lows
1. Repetition — don’t change your strategy.
2. Rational deliberation—adopt the strategyALWAYS-DEFECT.Here
we assume that rational agents analyse the prisoner’s dilemma in the
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classic way, hence recognizing defection as the dominant move in each
round of the game.
3. Imitation— among your neighbours, i.e. the agents you are linked to,
consider the one with the highest pay-off. If his pay-off is greater than
yours, abandon your old strategy and adopt his.
4. Inquiry — the same as imitation, but consider all agents, rather than
your neighbours only.
While in the consumat approach individuals have different kinds of needs,
in the prisoner’s dilemma the fitness of one agent simply corresponds to his
average pay-off per interaction E. Each agent is defined by a satisfaction
threshold ST [0,1]. Agent i is satisfied if
𝐸𝑖 > 𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑇 𝑖
where TP stands for temptation, which is the maximum pay-off obtainable
(see Figure 1).
Intuitively, an agent with a very high ST is ambitious. For example,
supposeSTi= .9. Thismeans that agent i is satisfied only if he obtains on av-
erage at least .9 TP. This could be possible if agent i’s strategy is ALWAYS-
DEFECT and most of his neighbours, with which he interacts every round,
play the ALWAYS-COOPERATE strategy. Since this is very unlikely, Ei
will normally be far below .9 TP and agent i will be unsatisfied. This means
he will often change his strategy, engaging in the two expensive cognitive
processes — rational deliberation and social inquiring.
On the other hand, an agent with a low ST is unmotivated. For example,
suppose STj = 0. Agent j is always satisfied and has no interest in investing
resources in cognitively expensive processes. He will always repeat his last
strategy or imitate his successful neighbours.
Each agent is also defined by a confidence threshold CT [0,1]. CT simply
stands as the chance of being confident at a given time. For example, sup-
pose CTi = .5. This means that agent i has equal chances of engaging in the
individually driven processes and in the socially driven ones.
Agents have different threshold values. Hence, they evolve heteroge-
neously. For example, suppose STk = .2 and CTk = .9. Agent k tends to
repeat because easily satisfied and often confident — he rarely changes his
strategy. On the other hand, suppose STl = .7 and CTl = .3. Agent l tends
to engage in social inquiry, because he is hard to satisfy and often confident.
Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of the characters of agent k and
agent l. It is evident how they would respond differently given the same
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conditions — a given level of uncertainty (on the y axis) and of satisfaction
(on x the axis).
Suppose now agent k and agent l are the only two agents of a given soci-
ety. The pay-off are temptation = 5, reward = 3, punishment = 1 and sucker
= 0. At time t = 1, both agents’ strategy is ALWAYS-COOPERATE. Agent
k and agent l cooperate and each of them gets a pay-off of 3, the reward.
Agent k is satisfied as
𝐸𝑘 > 𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑘
3 > 5 ∗ 0.1
On the other hand, agent l is not satisfied as
𝐸𝑙 < 𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑇 𝑙
3 < 5 ∗ 0.7
We draw now a random number for agent k and for time t. Suppose we draw
.4. As .4 < 𝐶𝑇𝑘, agent k is confident. We do the same for agent l and draw
.1. This means agent l is confident, as .1 < 𝐶𝑇 𝑙.
In this example, agent k is satisfied and confident. He repeats his strat-
egy, which remains ALWAYS-COOPERATE. On the other hand, agent l is
not satisfied, but confident. He deliberates and his strategy changes from
ALWAYS-COOPERATE to ALWAYS-DEFECT.
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4. Consumat agents play the prisoner’s dilemma
Adapting the consumat approach to the prisoner’s dilemma would be trivial
if it did not lead to different results when compared to an homogeneous evo-
lutionary dynamic, such as simple imitation. We introduce an agent-based
model that runs both the simple imitation mechanism and the consumat one
(Section 4.1). We run the same experiment varying only the evolutionary
dynamic and show that — at least for a reasonable parameter set — the
final population is different (Section 4.2).
4.1. The agent-based model
The agent based model runs an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Pay-off are the
usual ones — temptation = 5, reward = 3, punishment = 1 and sucker = 0.
Each round, agents play one match of the prisoner’s dilemma with all their
neighbours. Evolution takes place every 100 rounds. The simulation can run
with
• different noise values, which stand for the chance to misunderstand
one of your neighbours’ move.
• two different networks, a regular square lattice network and a scale-
free network. One agent’s neighbourhood is defined as the agents he is
linked to.4
• two different evolutionary dynamics, the simple imitation and the con-
sumat approach. In case the latter mechanism is chosen, the user of
the simulation has to choose the average ST and CT of agents. Gen-
erate thresholds follow a normal distribution, with a default standard
deviation of .25. For example, setting a very high average ST leads
most agents to be ambitious (see Section 3.2).
The population consists of thirteen equally represented strategies, listed be-
low. The first seven strategies were submitted by colleagues and include
both popular ones, such as TIT-FOR-TAT, and original ones, such as HYS-
TERIC — which is a stochastic version of TIT-FOR-TAT. The eigth strat-
egy, called BAYESIAN, was developed by the present author for the pur-
pose of this simulation. Finally, the last four strategies, such as ALWAYS-
COOPERATE and RANDOM, are classic ones that we added for complete-
ness. Here follows a list of the thirteen strategies and a intuitive description
of each of them:
4 Intuitively, a scale-free network is a network in which nodes do not have the same number of links. The
number of links per node follows a particular distribution. For an introduction to complex network, see for
example Barabasi [7].
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1. ALWAYS-DEFECT. Agents playing this strategy always defect.
2. TIT-FOR-TAT.Agents playing this strategy cooperate the first round.
They then copy the opponent’s move in the previous round.
3. PATIENT. Like TIT-FOR-TAT, but agents playing this strategy de-
fect only if the opponent has defected in more than half of the previous
round.
4. HYSTERIC. Like TIT-FOR-TAT, but agents playing this strategy
change their move to the opposite one with a chance of 0.2.
5. LUNATIC. Like TIT-FOR-TAT, but agents playing this strategy will
change their move to the opposite one every 5 turns.
6. GRIM. Agents playing this cooperate until the opponent defects for
the first time. They then defect for the rest of the game.
7. CHAMELEON.Agents playing this strategy start playing randomand
ten adjust the chances of defecting and cooperating according to the
success of others agents playing the same strategy.
8. DIEKMANN. Like TIT-FOR-TAT, but agents playing this strategy
play two unconditional cooperation every 10 rounds.
9. BAYESIAN.Agents playing this strategy try to understandwhat kind
of strategy their opponents are playing and act accordingly. For ex-
ample, they defect if they think that their opponent is likely to keep
cooperating. On the other hand, they cooperate if they think their
opponent is likely to retaliate after a defection.
10. ALWAYS-COOPERATE. Agents playing this strategy always coop-
erates.
11. TIT-FOR-TWO-TATS. Like TIT-FOR-TAT, but agents playing this
strategy defect only after a series of two defections.
12. RANDOM. Agents playing this strategy, randomly choose to cooper-
ate or defect with equal probability.
13. WIN-STAY-LOSE-SHIFT. Agents playing this strategy defect the
first round. They then repeat the last move if they obtain the temp-
tation or reward pay-off, or choose the opposite move if they obtain
punishment or sucker pay-off.
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4.2. Simulation results
To test if consumat agents evolve differently from simple imitating ones we
run the same experiment varying only the evolutionary dynamic. The com-
mon parameters are noise level (.05), kind of network (scale-free), size of pop-
ulation (about 340 agents) and length of the simulation (50 generations). The
following results are averages of 100 repetitions for each experiment.
If the chosen evolutionary dynamic is simple imitation the population
becomes strongly dominated by the DIEKMANN strategy, while 10 of the
13 initial strategy disappear (see Figure 6). DIEKMANN agents, which rep-
resent about the 91% of the final population, play just like TIT-FOR-TAT,
but every 10th and 11th move cooperate unconditionally.
If we chose the consumat evolutionary dynamic the results are greatly
influenced by the threshold parameters. It should be clear that pure imi-
tation is a special case of the consumat approach and can be obtained if all
agents are satisfied and not confident — e.g. for all agents, setting ST = 0
and CT = 0.
As no empirical data are available to suggest exact values for the thresh-
olds, for the following example we have arbitrary chosen the plausible values
ST = .2 and CT = .8. ST = .2 means that, on average, agents are satisfied if
they get at least the punishment pay-off.5 CT = .8 means that, one average,
agents are confident four rounds out of five. Combining these two values, we
obtain that each round about half of the agents repeat, one-fifth imitate and
deliberate and one-tenth inquire.
The resulting population after 50 generation is illustrated in Figure 7. A
striking difference is that this time neither strategy disappears nor dominates
the population. The fact that no strategy disappears can be easily explained
by the number of agents that repeat at every generation, resisting to change.
ALWAYS-DEFECT is the most played strategy despite a poor average pay-
off, because it is the choice of all the agents who deliberate, plus the ones
resisting to change. The remaining four most common strategies are those
who cope well with noise and which all get about the same average pay-off
— BAYESIAN, DIEKMANN, PATIENT and TIT-FOR-TWO-TATS.
Finally, the BAYESIAN strategy, which disappeared in the first experi-
ment, outperforms all other strategies. This asymmetry can be explained by
the fact that in the first experiment all the surviving strategies are not ex-
ploitable. Hence, exploring opponent’s behavior with occasional defections
does not pay. On the other hand, in the second experiment a few individuals
of each strategy survive and BAYESIAN agents gain a little extra pay-off
playing against them.
5 In fact, 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑆𝑇 = 5 ∗ 0.2 = 1 = 𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡.
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5. Discussion
Some people like routines, others enjoy trying new ways to do things. Some
are ambitious, others easily satisfied. Moreover, the same individual can
adopt different strategies depending on the context. However, most formal
models of cultural evolution ignore such heterogeneity and assume that a
uniform mechanism fits all individuals at all times. The aim of this paper
is to challenge what we think is a poor representation of cultural evolution
in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, which is typically modelled as the simple
imitation of successful peers.
We have proposed a first tentative application of the consumat approach.
The formalization we introduce takes into account both the heterogeneity
among individuals—which can bemore or less prone to undertake one of the
possible evolution patterns — and the fact that the choice of an individual
can vary according to the circumstances.
To test the consumat prisoner’s dilemma against the traditional simple
imitation, we have developed an agent-based model and run an experiment.
Even if this experiment is meant to be only an example, we are satisfied with
the results. They show that it is possible to obtain significantly different final
populations with alternative evolutionary mechanisms.
We also think the consumat results are qualitatively more similar to the
empirical data obtained from laboratory experiments, in which only a frac-
tion of the individuals defect — in our example it is about half. Game the-
ory and evolutionary models of the prisoner’s dilemma make very different
predictions. In fact, according to game theory we should expect an equilib-
rium of pure defection. If this forecast is clearly too pessimistic, evolution-
ary models — such as Axelrod’s — suggest we should expect everyone to be
nice unless provoked— playing some variant of TIT-FOR-TAT. Reality lies
somewhere in between — just like the consumat approach seems to suggest.
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